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Municipal Services And Equal
Protection: Variations On A Theme
By Griffin v. Illinois
By RALPH S. ADASCAL*
In running over the pages of our history, we shall scarcely meet
with a single great event of the last seven hundred years that has
not promoted equality of condition.
Nor is this phenomenon at all peculiar to France. Wherever we
look, we perceive the same revolution going on throughout the Chris-
tian world.
The gradual development of the principle of equality is, there-
fore, a providential fact .... [I]t is universal, it is lasting, it con-
stantly eludes all human inference, and all events as well as all
men contribute to its progress.
-Alexis de Toqueville,
I Democracy in America 5-6 (P. Bradley ed.
1956).
A Preliminary Appraisal
In the new industrial towns, the most elementary traditions of
municipal service were absent. Whole quarters were sometimes with-
out water even from local wells. On occasion, the poor would go
from house to house in the middle-class sections, begging for water
.... Open drains represented, despite their foulness, comparative
municipal affluence .... 1 Block after block repeats the same for-
mation: there are the same dreary streets, the same shadowed, rub-
bish-filled alleys, the same absence of open spaces for children's play
and gardens.... [T]hose who speak glibly of urban improve-
ments during this period ... fight shy of the actual facts: they gen-
erously impute to the town as a whole benefits which only the more
favored middle-class minority enjoyed....2
Mumford in the above passage was speaking of nineteenth-century
England, not the contemporary United States. Yet, his description
of England during the industrial revolution may be applicable to
many areas of the United States today.
Urban and rural slums are characterized by the nonexistence or
inadequacy of most municipal services.3 These inadequate services
* Member, California Bar.
1 L. MuM Fo D, THE CiTy iN HisToxy 463 (1961).
2 Id. at 462.
s NATIONAL AIsoRY CownuIssIoN ON CIvIL DIsoRmDEs, REPoRT 138-39,
147-48 (1968) [hereinafter cited as CIriL DisoRDERS REPoRT].
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tend to affect the attitudes of the residents. For example, the
United States Riot Commission stated that "inadequate sanitation
services are viewed by many ghetto residents not merely as in-
stances of poor public service but as manifestations of racial dis-
crimination." 4 The direct influence of inadequate municipal services
is not limited to those people immediately affected. The Commission
noted that "'residents of areas bordering on slums feel that sanita-
tion and neighborhood cleanliness is a crucial issue . . .constituting
an important psychological index of 'how far gone' their area is.' "5
As a generalization, it seems safe to say that the inadequacy of
municipal services in large areas of both rural and urban communi-
ties is a result of the ineffective or non-existent political represen-
tation of those who live in these areas.0
The purpose of this article is to explore the legal arguments
which may be employed to rectify the problem of inadequate munici-
pal services. The term municipal services is used here in its broad-
est sense to denote those services provided by the municipality to its
citizens whether in the form of labor, maintenance or improve-
ment. The problem usually is one of the situs and the adequacy of
the service. This article will first explore some of the common law
and statutory remedies available to citizens not receiving adequate
services. Some likely constitutional remedies will then be considered
generally, followed by a discussion specifically focused upon the equal
protection clause and its relation to classifications based on wealth.
In conclusion, the application of the equal protection clause to the
problem considered by this article will be examined. Since this is a
new type of litigation it may be beneficial at the outset to explore
the nature of the problem by way of illustration.
Two actions have been filed recently in a federal district court in
Mississippi which exemplify the problem and which raise and argue
There is a dearth of published studies dealing with the problem. For
example, the Commission Report states that "[tihere is no known study
comparing sanitation services between slum and non-slum areas." Id. at
138, quoting Robert Patricelli, Memorandum To The Commission, Nov. 16,
1967. Professor John W. Dyckman, Chairman, Department of City and Re-
gional Planning, University of California at Berkeley, states that the problem
is one with which many planners are concerned. They believe that slums
are inadequately serviced but they have not documented the problem ade-
quately. Telephone conversation with Professor John W. Dyckman, Dec. 31,
1968.
4 CIvnL DisORDERs REPORT, supra note 3, at 148.
5 Id. at 138 (emphasis added), quoting Robert Patricelli, Memorandum
To The Commission, Nov. 16, 1967.
6 "In short, the middle-class city dweller has relatively fewer needs
for public services and is reasonably well positioned to move the system to
his benefit." Id. at 148.
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some of the issues that will be raised in this article." The plaintiffs
in each case are poor Negro residents of the defendant towns. The
plaintiffs allege that the towns have underserviced8 the areas in which
they live, relative to the white areas, in the construction and main-
tenance of streets, sidewalks, curbs, fire hydrants, street lighting,
sewerage, water pressure, and garbage collection, because they are
black and poor.9 Nearly all the above mentioned municipal services
have been paid for in the past out of general revenues; only in the
case of some sidewalks have special assessments against property
owners been made.10 Plaintiffs seek an order to compel the de-
fendants to rectify past underservicing and to restrain them from
expending funds for municipal services in white neighborhoods until
the services in their neighborhoods have been substantially equal-
ized.
A recent California case presented similar issues and legal prob-
lems. A complaint was filed with the California Public Utilities
Commission by a group of Mexican-American farmworkers who
lived in the town of Wasco. n Their area of the town was popu-
lated predominantly by poor Mexican-Americans. This section was
served by a private water company, while the rest of the town was
served by a municipal water company. The complainants alleged
that the water they received was oily, turgid, bacteria-ridden and
unpalatable. They also alleged that the rate they were charged
for water was higher than that charged those residents of the town
served by the municipal water company. This case was settled; the
complainants were refunded more than $4,600 in excess charges and
the water company "agreed to set up a procedure for resolving fu-
ture complaints by Wasco water consumers.' 12
7 Hawkins v. Shaw, Civil No. DC6737, CCH POVERTY L. REP. 1 2400.40
(N.D. Miss., filed Nov. 21, 1967); Harris v. Itta Bena, Civil No. GC6756 (N.D.
Miss., filed Nov. 21, 1967).
8 "Underserviced" shall be used hereafter to refer to either a total lack
of or an inadequacy of services.
9 Hawkins v. Shaw, Civil No. DC6737, CCH POVERY L. REP. 2400.40
(N.D. Miss., filed Nov. 21, 1967); Harris v. Itta Bena, Civil No. GC6756 (N.D.
Miss., filed Nov. 21, 1967). The complaints are substantially similar (both
classes of plaintiffs are represented by the NAACP Legal Defense and Edu-
cational Fund, Inc.).
10 Answers to Interrogatories of Plaintiffs, Feb. 12, 1968, Hawkins v.
Shaw, Civil No. DC6737, CCH POVERTY L. REP. 11 2400.40 (N.D. Miss., filed
Nov. 21, 1967); Answers to Interrogatories of Plaintiffs, Jan. 31, 1968, Harris
v. Itta Bena, Civil No. GC6756 (N.D. Miss., filed Nov. 21, 1967).
11 California Pub. Util. Comm'n, File Nos. 699, IC-45691-W, CCH POVEaTY
L. REP. ff 2400.88 (Nov. 11, 1966).
12 CEB LEGAL SERVICES GAzETTE, Aug. 1967, at 106.
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Some Common Law and Statutory Remedies
Abuse of Discretion
The doctrine of the separation of powers dictates that the ordi-
nary acts and decisions of municipal authorities are considered to be
legislative in nature and not within the scope of the judicial power.13
The provision of most municipal services is considered a discretionary
function of municipal authorities. In addition to having the discretion
to provide the service, municipal authorities possess discretion as to
the mechanics of its provision as well.' 4
The typical challenge to the propriety of municipal expenditures
for the provision of services involves a single plaintiff who com-
plains, for example, that a particular improvement is too costly,15
that an alternative public building site should have been chosen,16
or that a street should or should not be widened or repaved.'7 The
courts have responded with innumerable variations of the following
rule:
Assuming that the municipal authorities have acted within the orbit
of their lawful authority, no principle of law is better established than
that courts will not sit in review of proceedings of municipal officers
... involving legislative discretion, except ... in case of fraud,
corruption, or arbitrary, unreasonable actions amounting to abuse of
discretion.'8
13 Silver v. Los Angeles, 57 Cal. 2d 39, 366 P.2d 651, 17 Cal. Rptr. 379
(1961), cert. denied, 369 U.S. 873 (1962). "Under such circumstances, [the city
councilmen] are answerable to the electorate, but not the courts . .. ." Id.
at 42, 366 P.2d at 653, 17 Cal. Rptr. at 381; accord, Santa Barbara City Council
v. Superior Court, 179 Cal. App. 2d 389, 3 Cal. Rptr. 796 (1960).
14 "It is well settled, and it has been affirmed repeatedly by numerous
judicial decisions of the several jurisdictions, that in the absence of consti-
tutional or charter restrictions, municipal discretion includes the nature and
extent of the improvement, the location of the improvement, the plans and
manner of construction, the nature and kind of material to be used ......
13 E. McQuILLAN, THE LAw OF MUNICIPAL ColpoRATioNs, § 37.25, at 98-100
(3d ed. 1950) (emphasis added) [hereinafter cited as 13 McQuI.LAN].
15 E.g., Parker v. Concord, 71 N.H. 468, 52 A. 1095 (1902).
16 Old Town Dev. Corp. v. Urban Renewal Agency, 249 Cal. App. 2d
313, 57 Cal. Rptr. 426 (1967). A frequent complaint is that a public improve-
ment, such as a garbage dump, an incinerator or some other unsightly or
odoriferous public facility, is located too close to the plaintiff. E.g., Thomas
v. Grinnell, 171 Iowa 571, 153 N.W. 91 (1915); cf. Gautreaux v. Chicago Housing
Authority, 265 F. Supp. 582 (N.D. Ill. 1967), where plaintiff alleged that the
defendant had, for 17 years, selected sites for public housing in completely
(or nearly so) Negro neighborhoods to maintain, or the effect of which was to
maintain, racial segregation. If decided under principles to be developed, the
site selection would have been invalidated.
17 Denver v. Bargain Land & Inv. Co., 83 Colo. 551, 267 P. 405 (1928).
See generally 13 McQuILAN, supra note 14, at § 37.26.
18 2 E. McQuinLLN, THE LAw OF MUmcuICAL CoaRoRATioNs § 10.33, at 823-24
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The California case of Manjares v. Newton 9 presents a good
example of the manner by which the key phrase "arbitrary" action or
"abuse of discretion" can be interpreted by a court to curtail the un-
equal distribution of municipal services. The plaintiffs in Manjares
sought a writ of mandate compelling the members of the Board of
Education of the Carmel School District to resume school bus service
for their children. The closest school was fifteen miles from their
home; the closest regularly scheduled school bus route was more than
six miles from their home. The school authorities refused to con-
tinue the service to the plaintiffs on the grounds that the costs were
excessive and that a continuation of the service created the possibil-
ity that other families in similar situations might also demand such
bus service. School authorities relied on a statute which provides
that a school district "may provide ... for the transportation of pu-
pils to and from school whenever in the judgment of the board such
transportation is advisable and good reasons exist therefor. '20 Not-
ing that the district provided transportation to other children in areas
farther from schools than the area in which the plaintiffs lived, the
trial court directed the defendants by means of mandamus to resume
service, and "concluded that the board's action in refusing transpor-
tation was arbitrary, capricious, discriminatory, and unreasonable and
deprived plaintiffs of free schooling and of due process of law and
equal protection of the laws."21 The California Supreme Court af-
firmed on limited grounds holding that the action of the board was
arbitrary and unreasonable.22 The court declined to reach the con-
stitutional issues of due process and equal protection. The abuse of
discretion concept would appear to provide a court with an alter-
native means to give relief in a municipal equalization case where
the court wished to avoid the constitutional issues. 23 It should be
pointed out that this case dealt with the termination of an existing
service and not the failure to provide a new or additional service
that was necessary to equalize the service to wealthy and not-so-
(3d ed. rev. 1966) (emphasis added) [hereinafter cited as 2 McQuLLAN]; see,
e.g., Burns v. American Cas. Co., 127 Cal. App. 2d 198, 206, 273 P.2d 605, 610
(1954); 3 C. ANTAu, MuNicIPAL CoRPOmuTIoN LAw §§ 23.00, 23.01, 23.11 (1967).
'9 64 Cal. 2d 365, 411 P.2d 901, 49 Cal. Rptr. 805 (1966).
20 CAL. EDUC. CODE § 16801.
21 64 Cal. 2d at 370, 411 P.2d at 905, 49 Cal. Rptr. at 809.
22 Id. at 378, 411 P.2d at 910, 49 Cal. Rptr. at 814.
23 Manlares is a rather liberal interpretation of the "abuse of discretion"
doctrine. An example of a stricter decision states that to justify judicial inter-
ference, the abuses "should appear, not by the mere weight of the evidence,
and the opinion of the greater number of witnesses, but so conclusively that
all reasonable doubt is overcome." Morse v. Westport, (Mo. 1895), rev'd on
other grounds, 136 Mo. 276, 37 S.W. 932 (1896); see 13 McQU-LLAw, supra note
14, at 679 n.91.
wealthy communities. It would seem to be easier to establish an
abuse of discretion by the termination of the existing service than
it would be to establish such abuse by the failure to provide a new
or additional service.
The Public Utility Doctrine24
The essence of the public utility doctrine is that a municipality
which provides services similar to those provided by privately owned
public utilities has a duty to serve all the members of the public
within its territorial boundaries in an equal and nondiscriminatory
manner.25 There are two major limitations upon the doctrine.
First, a decision not to extend services to areas where those services
are sought, when based upon a bona fide business judgment that
extension of the service would be inordinately expensive due to topo-
graphical peculiarities or low population density of the areas, will be
upheld.26 Secondly, the class of services subject to the doctrine is
limited to those services traditionally furnished by private utilities,
e.g., transportation, telephone, water, garbage, gas, and electricity.27
These are all services which are furnished in discrete amounts cap-
able of unit pricing. By contrast, services such as fire and police
protection, street cleaning and street-trash pickup, street maintenance
and other similar services, the cost of which cannot be apportioned
directly to those benefited, are not embraced by the doctrine.28
Sayles v. Bennett Avenue Development Corporation,29 illus-
trates the operation of the doctrine in a controversy which could
have been resolved by constitutional principles. The plaintiffs were
all residents of an area of the City of Council Bluffs, Iowa, which was
separated from the major part of the city by the Missouri River. The
major part of the city had long been serviced by a municipal sewer
system. Several years prior to the action, the defendant corporation
was organized to provide sewer service to the residents of an area
not within the city limits, but adjacent to the area in which the
plaintiffs lived. The corporation and the city entered into a con-
tract whereby the corporation would extend its facilities to the plain-
24 This discussion relies substantially on Michelman, Obtaining a Fair
Share of Municipal Services Through Legal Proceedings (undated memoran-
dum written for the Civil Rights Law Institute of the NAACP Legal Defense
and Educational Fund on file in the Hastings Law Library) [hereinafter cited
as Municipal Services Memorandum].
25 See generally Note, The Duty of a Public Utility to Render Adequate
Service: Its Scope and Enforcement, 62 CoLOm. L. REv. 312 (1962).
26 Id. at 314-19.
27 Municipal Services Memorandum, supra note 24, at 7.
28 Id.
29 258 Iowa 628, 138 N.W.2d 895 (1965).
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tiffs' area of the city. The effect of the arrangement, however, was
that the sewer facilities would be provided "in such [a] fashion as to
result in different and higher sewage charge .... 0 The court en-
joined the defendant from proceeding with its proposed plan and
said:
"[Tjhe obligation of mutual burden bearing which rests upon the
congested population of cities and towns requires that the expense of
making them convenient, comfortable, and healthful shall, so far as
practicable, be equitably distributed upon all property enjoying the
benefit. . . ." The burden... carries with it the concomitant rights
to be treated fairly and equally in sharing this burden and receiving
the benefits ...
The other residents of the city are receiving cheaper service to
meet the same needs. These residents are entitled to substantially
equal treatment .... 31
The public utility doctrine served as a much more effective basis
for relief in this case than an equal protection argument would
have been. From an equal protection perspective, since the plaintiffs
were not from a racial minority group and therefore could not
show unlawful classification based upon race, in order to obtain re-
lief they would have had to claim that they were not classified in a
rational manner which entitled the city to provide sewage at greater
expense. But the additional costs incumbent in extending service
across the river is just the type of rational basis for differential
treatment or classification that the courts approve.32
Title VI of the 1964 Civil Rights Act
The Civil Rights Act of 1964 may also provide a basis for relief
where municipal services are wholly or partially subsidized by fed-
eral funds, and the discrimination is within the scope of the pro-
hibitions of the statute. The act provides that "[n]o person in the
United States shall, on the ground of race, color, or national origin,
be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be
subjected to discrimination under any program or activity receiving
Federal financial assistance.13 3 Both the regulations of the Depart-
ment of Health, Education and Welfare and the Department of Hous-
ing and Urban Development, issued pursuant to this statute require
that:
A recipient, in determining the location or types of . . . facilities,
services ... or other benefits which will be provided under any
[federally assisted] program or activity ... may not... utilize cri-
80 Id. at 637, 138 N.W.2d at 900.
31 Id. at 638-39, 138 N.W.2d at 901, quoting in part Bell v. Burlington,
154 Iowa 607, 614, 134 N.W. 1082, 1084 (1912).
32 See generally Municipal Services Memorandum, supra note 24, at
3-4.
33 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (1964).
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teria or methods of administration which have the effect ... of de-
feating or substantially impairing accomplishment of the objec-
tives of the program or activity as respect persons of a particular
race. . .. 4
The importance of the term "effect" in these regulations is sub-
stantial. It should obviate the need to show intentional discrimina-
tion. This will be elaborated on later.35 Of course, the Civil Rights
Act is of no assistance where the deprived group is suffering only from
economic rather than racial or ethnic disadvantages.
Development of Equal Protection Theory
Mr. Justice Holmes once said that the equal protection clause is
"the usual last resort of constitutional arguments." 36  That there
has been a change in judicial attitude from that expressed by Jus-
tice Holmes is well recognized.3 7 The ascendancy of the equal pro-
tection clause was long ago recognized and presaged by Professors
Tussman and tenBroek in the seminal article on the clause.3 8 Six-
teen years later, Professor tenBroek stated with continued foresight:
[A]fter having been for nearly a century lost and forgotten or
subverted by the separate but equal strategem, equal protection is
again emerging.... The work in the name of equality is far from
done .... Beyond the schools lie ... public accommodations of ev-
ery sort ... housing, jobs, voting, police protection, and so on. And
still beyond them all are poverty and the victims of poverty ...
where race prejudice, minority status, and many other social and per-
sonal factors are compounded.3 9
Edwards v. California-Ancestral Cousin
The purpose of this present discussion is to point out the grow-
ing recognition of the invidious nature of classifications founded up-
on economic status. It is quite appropriate to begin such a discus-
34 24 C.F.R. § 1.4(b) (2) (1968) (emphasis added); accord, 45 C.F.R. § 80.49
(b) (2) (1968).
35 See notes 79-82 and accompanying text infra.
36 Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200, 208 (1927).
37 Nevertheless: "[T]he equal protection clause has consolidated its posi-
tion as the cutting edge of our expanding constitutional liberty." Hobsen v.
Hansen, 269 F. Supp. 401, 493 (D.D.C. 1967). "[For a decade and a half] the
decisions implementing the equal protection clause [have] set new constitu-
tional goals for the states and the Congress, which lie substantially beyond
accepted practices and whose achievement requires affirmative governmental
action." Cox, Foreword: Constitutional Adjudication and the Promotion of
Human Rights; The Supreme Court, 1965 Term, 80 HARv. L. REV. 91 (1966); see
Goldberg, Equality and Governmental Action, 39 N.Y.U.L. REV. 205, 211-12
(1964).
8 Tussman & tenBroek, The Equal Protection of the Laws, 37 CAIrF. L.
RE.v. 341 (1949).
39 J. TENBROEK, EQUAL UNDER LAw 15-16 (rev. ed. 1965).
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sion with the legal treatment accorded the poor in Edwards v. Cal-
ifornia.40 Mr. Justice Byrnes, speaking for the majority, held that a
state could not exclude impoverished immigrants from its territory
on the basis of its police power.4' However, the holding was
based on the pre-emption doctrine of the commerce clause rather
than on individual rights. Mr. Justice Jackson, concurring, recog-
nized the incongruity of treating humans on the basis of rules of
trade. In his separate opinion, he preferred to rest the decision on
the privileges and immunities clause of the fourteenth amendment:
We should say now, and in no uncertain terms, that a man's mere
property status, without more, cannot be used by a state to test,
qualify, or limit his rights as a citizen of the United States. "Indi-
gence" in itself is neither a source of rights nor a basis for denying
them. The mere state of being without funds is a neutral fact-con-
stitutionally an irrelevance, like race, creed, or color.42
The noteworthy aspect of this case for present purposes is that the
poor, merely because of this status, were receiving constitutional rec-
ognition.43
Griffin v. Illinois-Paterfamilias
Fifteen years passed after Edwards was decided before the Court
was squarely presented, in Griffin v. Illinois,44 with the question
whether rights could be denied or abridged because of a man's lack of
command over enough wealth to assert them.
The State of Illinois, as most states, required the submission of a
transcript of the proceedings in the lower court in an appeal from a
conviction of a crime.4 5 The Illinois statute also provided that
"[w]rits of error in all criminal cases are writs of right and shall be
40 314 U.S. 160 (1941).
41 Id. at 173.
42 Id. at 184-85 (emphasis added). Similar legislation had been upheld
104 years earlier. It was held to be both necessary and proper to protect the
state from the "moral pestilence of paupers," as well as the "physical pesti-
lence" of "infectious articles." New York City v. Miln, 36 U.S. (11 Pet.) 102,
142 (1837). The last vestige of authority that Miln might have had has been
dispelled by Thompson v. Shapiro, 270 F. Supp. 331 (D. Conn. 1967) (three-
judge court), probable jurisdiction noted 389 U.S. 820, reargument ordered,
392 U.S. 1919 (1968), and the numerous other cases striking down welfare
residency statutes. The cases are collected in CCH PovuaTy L. REP. 1200.22
(1968).
43 For a discussion of the problem of constitutional recognition of
minorities, see Kaplan, Equal Justice in an Unequal World: Equality for the
Negro-The Problem of Special Treatment, 61 Nw. U.L. REV. 363 (1966).
44 351 U.S. 12 (1956).
45 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 769.1 (1965) (writ of error in criminal case is
writ of right); ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 110, § 101.65 (1965) (report of proceedings
for direct criminal appeal).
1375
THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL
issued of course."' 46 The specific issue was whether a state could
"administer this statute so as to deny adequate appellate review to
the poor [by requiring a transcript of the trial proceedings which
they could not obtain only because of their penury] while granting
such review to others." 4' Griffin was convicted of a crime in Illi-
nois, appealed, pleaded indigency and asked for a free transcript in
order to prosecute his appeal. The request for a transcript was de-
nied on the ground that free transcripts were available only to those
convicted of capital crimes. Griffin, unable to provide a transcript,
was denied an appeal. He brought the issue to the Supreme Court,
alleging a denial of fourteenth amendment due process and equal
protection.
Speaking for the majority, Mr. Justice Black, joined by the Chief
Justice and Justices Douglas and Clark, agreed that both the due
process and equal protection clauses required the state to provide a
free transcript to indigent defendants in order to provide equal access
to the appellate process, although an appeal was a matter of legisla-
tive grace and not a constitutional right.48 Mr. Justice Frankfurter
concurred specially, apparently resting his opinion on the equal pro-
tection clause.49  Justices Burton, Minton, Harlan and Reed dis-
sented.
Griffin falls within the class of cases, the leading one of which
is Yick Wo v. Hopkins,50 which holds that the unequal impact of a
law fair on its face, without justification, constitutes a denial of
equal protection.51 This is a denial of equal protection of the laws
which is as objectionable as the enactment of an expressly unequal
statute. The Griffin case presented a dominant equal protection
question, yet Justice Black persisted in averting to the due process
clause as well. The due process discussion was not improper; the
facts also presented an issue of "fundamental fairness" in the ad-
ministration of criminal justice, which is the traditional office of the
due process clause. It is, in fact, an excellent illustration of the
overlap between equal protection and due process. The Court, in a
series of subsequent cases, however, seems to indicate that the more
substantial, if not exclusive, basis for its decision was equal protec-
tion.52 Most of the commentators agree.53
46 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 769.1 (1965).
47 351 U.S. at 13.
48 Id. at 18. The latter point was an affirmation, by way of dictum, of
McKane v. Durston, 153 U.S. 684, 687 (1894).
49 351 U.S. at 21-24.
50 118 U.S. 356 (1886).
51 Id. at 373-74.
52 It was stated in Burns v. Ohio, 360 U.S. 252 (1959), that "[tjhe
imposition by the State of financial barriers [here, a filing fee on appeal]
[V ol. 20
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Before proceeding with the proposed application of the equal
protection clause to the poor in civil cases involving inferior muni-
cipal services, it is necessary to examine the methods the courts
currently use for its application.
The Varieties of Equal Protection Experience
Classifications-Reasonable or Unreasonable
Equal Protection cases can be divided into at least two basic
categories. The majority of such cases can be resolved on the basis
of the reasonable classification doctrine which involves the follow-
ing three-step procedure. First, the purpose or objective that the
state seeks to achieve is determined from the legislative or adminis-
trative act or, in many cases, it is divined by the court. Second, the
means chosen to achieve the objective-the classification-is deter-
mined. Finally, the question is asked whether the means bears a
reasonable (that is, logical) relationship to the objective sought to be
achieved.5 4 A good example of this type of case with some of the
restricting the availability of appellate review for indigent criminal defendants
has no place in our heritage of Equal Justice Under Law." Id. at 258. In
Smith v. Bennett, 365 U.S. 708 (1961), the Court invalidated the imposition of
a filing fee, stating: "We hold that to interpose any financial consideration
between an indigent prisoner ... and his exercise of a state right to sue for
his liberty is to deny [him] the equal protection of the laws." Id. at 709.
Although Griffin and Burns were cited, no reference to due process was
made. Finally, the taxing of unsuccessful indigent criminal appellants for the
costs of providing transcripts, to be paid from their prisonhouse earnings, was
invalidated in Rinaldi v. Yeager, 384 U.S. 305 (1966). The Court relied solely
on equal protection. Contra, Harper v. Board of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 682
n.3 (1966) (Harlan, J.) (dissenting opinion); Douglas v. California, 372 U.S.
353, 361 n.1 (1963) (Harlan, J.) (dissenting opinion). Justice Harlan's dissents,
in these and other cases, strongly confirm that the true basis of these dicisions
is equal protection; since the court was entering new territory, it had to be
more circumspect; as a dissenter, he had no need (and little stomach) for
the ambiguity.
53 See, e.g., Allen, Griffin v. Illinois: Antecedents and Aftermath, 25 U.
COn. L. REv. 151, 157 (1957); McKay, Political Thickets and Crazy Quilts:
Reapportionment and Equal Protection, 61 MicH. L. REV. 645, 676-77 (1963);
Schaefer, Federalism and State Criminal Procedure, 70 HARv. L. REv. 1, 10
(1956); Willcox & Bloustein, The Griffin Case-Poverty and the Fourteenth
Amendment, 43 CORN LL L.Q. 1, 10-11 (1957); The Supreme Court, 1955 Term,
70 HARv. L. REV. 95, 126-28 (1956); Note, Equal Protection and the Indigent
Defendant: Griffin and Its Progeny, 16 STAN. L. REV. 394, 396 (1964). But see
Hamley, The Impact of Griffin v. Illinois on State Court-Federal Court Rela-
tionships, 24 F.R.D. 75, 79 (1960).
54 See Tussman & tenBroek, The Equal Protection of the Laws, 37
CALi. L. REv. 341, 344-53 (1949), for an extensive exposition of the reasonable
classification analysis and its five logical possibilities: pure reason, pure un-
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typical rhetoric is Allied Stores v. Bowers. 5 An Ohio statute ex-
empted from ad valorem taxation "merchandise ... belonging to a
non-resident ... if held in a storage warehouse for storage only
.... "56 The Court upheld the statute stating:
The rule often has been stated to be that the classification '"must
rest upon some ground of difference having a fair and substantial
relation to the object of the legislation." Royster Guano Co. v. Vir-
ginia, 253 U.S. 412, 415. "If the selection or classification is neither
capricious nor arbitrary, and rests upon some reasonable consideration
of difference or policy, there is no denial of equal protection of the
Law." Brown-Forman Co. v. Kentucky, 217 U.S. 563, 573....
.... Similarly, it has long been settled that a classification, though
discriminatory, is not arbitrary nor violative of [equal protection]
* . . if any state of facts reasonably can be conceived that would sus-
tain it.57
Most cases in this category involve economic regulation, almost
all of which are sustained.58  There are two important characteris-
tics of the analytical framework relative to the reasonable classifica-
tion doctrine: (1) The court does not question the purpose or objec-
tive of the state; and (2) considerable latitude is given to the means
chosen (the classification) to achieve the stated or divined pur-
pose, with few such means found to be "arbitrary" or "capricious. ' '59
Consequently this categorical treatment would be unlikely to be use-
ful in challenging the inadequacy of municipal services. But the pro-
tections of the clause are not exhausted: by the reasonable classifica-
tion doctrine.
Classifications-Suspect
The second category of equal protection cases is smaller in num-
ber but more significant for purposes of this discussion. This cate-
gory involves the "suspect" classification doctrine, and unlike the
reasonable classification doctrine the existence of a rational rela-
tionship between the classification and the purpose of the law does
not end the inquiry.60 The practical effect of the utilization of
reason, under-inclusiveness, over-inclusiveness, and under-and-over-inclu-
siveness.
55 358 U.S. 522 (1959).
56 115 Ohio Laws 553 (1933).
57 Allied Stores v. Bowers, 358 U.S. 522, 527-28 (1959) (emphasis
added).
58 E.g., American Sugar Ref. Co. v. Louisiana, 179 U.S. 89 (1900); Brown-
Forman Co. v. Kentucky, 217 U.S. 563 (1910). But see Royster Guano Co. v.
Virginia, 253 U.S. 412 (1920).
59 The legislative judgment "is given the -benefit of every conceivable
circumstance which might suffice to characterize the classification as rea-
sonable rather than arbitrary .... " McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184,
191 (1964).
60 Striking down a law making criminal the cohabitation of a Negro
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traits which are deemed "suspect" (of suspect validity under the
equal protection clause) is to make the classification presumptively
unconstitutional. 61 The courts speak of such traits as "constitu-
tionally suspect,6 2 "traditionally disfavored,"63 "presumptively sus-
pect,"' 6 4 or "inherently suspect."' 6 5 The suspect classification doc-
trine frequently requires a result different from that which would be
achieved by application of the reasonable classification doctrine.
For example, in the Griffin case "there was a rational basis for this
... policy-to expend available funds in the most effective way by
providing transcripts to indigents only in more serious cases." 66 Yet
and a white person, the Court in McLaughlin v. Florida said: "Such a law,
even though enacted pursuant to a valid state interest, bears a heavy burden
of justification. . . and will be upheld only if it is necessary, and not merely
rationally related, to the accomplishment of a permissible state policy." Id.
at 196 (emphasis added).
61 Tussman & tenBroek, The Equal Protection of the Laws, 37 CALIF. L.
REv. 341, 353-61 (1949).
The authors also discuss a concept which they designate the "forbidden
classification." This would invalidate any classification based upon certain
traits. They suggest that the "chief value of the doctrine" would be in strik-
ing down "segregation laws." Id. at 355. McKay, Political Thickets and
Crazy Quilts: Reapportionment and Equal Protection, 61 Micn. L. REV. 645,
666 (1963), also speaks of classifications which are forbidden "because none is
permissible, as in segregation cases .... " The value of such "absolute" ab-
solutes in human affairs is questionable. See, e.g., Hamm v. Board of Elec-
tions, 230 F. Supp. 156 (E.D. Va.), affd sub nom., Tancil v. Woolls, 379
U.S. 19 (1964), which upheld a law requiring the racial designation of parties
to a divorce decree for statistical purposes. In Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1
(1967), Chief Justice Warren said that if racial classifications "are ever to be
upheld, they must be shown to be necessary to the accomplishment of some
permissible state objective." Id. at 11. Valid racial classifications, therefore,
presumably encompass statistical data and restrictions based on national origin
in a national emergency. Tancil v. Woolls, supra; Korematsu v. United
States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944).
For suggestions by individual members of the Court urging the recogni-
tion of the forbidden classification of race, see Loving v. Virginia, supra at
13 (Stewart, J.) (concurring opinion); McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184, 198
(1964) (Stewart, J.) (concurring opinion); Kotch v. Board of River Port Pilot
Comnm'rs, 330 U.S. 552, 564-67 (1947) (Rutledge, J.) (dissenting oinion).
62 McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184, 192 (1964); Bolling v. Sharpe,
347 U.S. 497, 499 (1954) (de jure racial segregation).
63 "Lines drawn on the basis of wealth or property.., are traditionally
disfavored." Harper v. Board of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 668 (1966).
64 Thompson v. Shapiro, 270 F. Supp. 331, 337 (D. Conn. 1967), probable
jurisdiction noted, 389 U.S. 1032, reargument ordered, 392 U.S. 1919 (1968).
65 Glona v. American Guar. & Liab. Ins. Co., 391 U.S. 73, 76 (1968)
(Harlan, J.) (dissenting opinion).
66 Horowitz, Unseparate But Unequal--The Emerging Fourteenth Amend-
ment Issue in Public School Education, 13 U.C.L.A.L. REv. 1147, 1156 (1966).
The four dissenters in Griffin urged this point, but Justice Black ignored it in
the majority opinion. Justice Harlan said: "A policy of economy may be un-
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the Supreme Court found the policy to be a denial of equal protection
of the laws.
Race, economic status, and place of residence in the reapportion-
ment cases have been accorded "suspect" status. Recently, bastardy
was added, in Levy v. Louisiana,67 where the denial to illegitimate
children of the right to maintain an action for their mother's wrong-
ful death was held to constitute "an invidious classification." 68 These
classifications are expressive of what Chief Justice Stone spoke of as
"prejudice against discrete and insular minorities" in his well-known
"footnote four" in United States v. Carotene Products Company.5
Judge Skelly Wright recently offered one of the few subsequent ju-
dicial amplifications of Chief Justice Stone's well-known dictum. In
explaining the necessity and purpose of the suspect classification doc-
trine, he said:
The explanation for this additional scrutiny of practices which ...
fall harshly on [the poor and racial minorities] relates to the judicial
attitude toward legislative and administrative judgments. Judicial
deference to these judgments is predicated in the confidence courts
have that they are just resolutions of conflicting interests. This con-
fidence is often misplaced when the vital interests of the poor and
racial minorities are involved. For these groups are not always as-
sured of a full and fair hearing through the ordinary political proc-
esses, not so much because of the chance of outright bias, but be-
cause of the abiding danger that the power structure-a term which
need carry no disparaging or abusive overtones-may incline to pay
little heed to even the deserving interests of a politically voiceless
and invisible minority. These considerations impel a closer judicial
surveillance and review of . .. judgments adversely affecting racial
minorities, and the poor, than would otherwise be necessary.0
A common thread running throughout the cases in this area oi
equal protection consideration, illustrated in Levy v. Louisiana,71 is
the use of the term "invidious." One meaning of the term is that it
expresses "hateful" or "spiteful" motives. 72  Another recurring
enlightened, but it is certainly not capricious." Id. at 37-38. But see Green v.
Department of Pub. Welfare, 270 F. Supp. 173, 177 (D. Del. 1967) (three-
judge court): "The protection of the public purse, no matter how worthy in
the abstract, is not a permissible basis for differentiating between persons who
otherwise possess the same status in their relationship to the State .... 
The statute held violative of equal protection imposed a one-year residency
requirement as a condition to the receipt of public assistance and it was
enacted to "protect the public purse." Id. See also Rinaldi v. Yeager, 384
U.S. 305 (1966).
67 391 U.S. 68 (1968).
68 Id. at 71; accord, Glona v. American Guar. & Liab. Ins. Co., 391
U.S. 73 (1968).
69 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938).
70 Hobsen v. Hansen, 269 F. Supp. 401, 507-08 (D.D.C. 1967).
71 391 U.S. 68 (1968).
72 Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942).
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phrase, and analytical device, appearing in these cases is that a sus-
pect classification is subject to the "most rigid scrutiny. '73
But if these classifications are so suspect, and are subject to such
rigid scrutiny, of what are they suspect, and for what must they be
scrutinized? First, they must be scrutinized for unreasonableness;
that is, the degree to which the classification does not include all
persons who are similarly situated with respect to the purpose of
the particular law. In these cases, a much stricter standard of a logi-
cal relationship between the end (legislative purpose) and the means
(classification) is required. An excellent example is the previously
mentioned case of Levy v. Louisiana.74 The purpose of wrongful
death statutes is to compensate in damages members of the family
of a decedent who might have been expected to receive support or
assistance from him had he lived. The Court held that "[1] egitimacy
or illegitimacy of birth has no relation to the nature of the wrong
* . . inflicted" by the tortfeasor on the decedent and on those who are
dependent upon his support,75 and accordingly struck down the
exclusion of illegitimates by Louisiana law.
The second object of most rigid scrutiny is the purpose or motive
behind the law. In any equal protection case, it is necessary to de-
termine the legislative purpose. The Court has done so, "however
vigorously it may protest the contrary."76 Explicit use of the term
"purpose" is frequently found, especially in the suspect classification
cases.77 But the term "motive" is usually found in a statement
that motives of the legislature are not questioned by the Court. 7
Only a few of the Justices have been explicit in admitting their in-
quiry into Legislative motives.79 This reluctance is understandable
considering the nature of our federal system; as a consequence, the
Court prefers to speak of the "result" or the "effect" rather than the
"motive" behind the act or action. Professors Tussman and tenBroek
explain the equivalence of these terms as follows:
The fact that the Court sometimes speaks of laws as discrimi-
73 Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944); see Loving v.
Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 11 (1967).
74 391 U.S. 68 (1968). See text accompanying notes 67-69 supra.
75 Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68, 72 (1968).
70 Van Alstyne & Karst, State Action, 14 STAr. L. REV. 3, 21-22 (1961).
77 See, e.g., Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369, 373-74 (1967); Rinaldi v.
Yeager, 384 U.S. 305, 309 (1966).
78 See, e.g., Tenny v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367, 377-78 (1951).
79 Compare Oyama v. California, 332 U.S. 633, 661 (1947) (Murphy, J.)
(concurring opinion) (California Alien Land Law product of "the great anti-
Oriental virus"), with Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 178 U.S. 356, 374 (1886), where Mr.
Justice Mathews stated while dissenting that "[no] reason for [the classifica-
tion] exists except hostility to the race and nationality to which petitioners
belong .... "
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natory in "result" does not really broaden the discriminatory legis-
lation category beyond the field of motive. For the situation is gen-
erally one in which-as for example in the Yick Wo and Kotch cases--
the challenged statute on its face is quite innocuous. Only its appli-
cation reveals the result that the classification falls along lines of
race or consanguinity. This result raises the question of whether the
classification, treated as "suspect" meets the reasonable relation
test or whether it is the expression of a discriminatory motive. It
is thus, apart from the classification problem, purely a question of
motive.8 0
Ought we then insist that courts directly consider motive in the
interests of purity of analysis? Not really. There is a multitude of
cases which clearly establish that it is not necessary to prove a dis-
criminatory motive on the part of state officials in order to establish
a violation of the equal protection clause.8 1 "[T]houghtlessness can
be as disasterous and unfair to private rights and the public interest
as the perversity of a willful scheme."82  That the constitutionality
of a state statute, policy, or administrative action may be tested by
its operation and effect as well as by the meaning of its bare terms is
a corollary of the special solicitude of the Constitution for those with
limited access to the political process.
83
Poverty and Equal Protection
The essence of the foregoing discussion is that governing entities
are prohibited by the equal protection clause from using "suspect"
classification schemes, e.g., schemes based upon race,8 4 territory, 5
80 Tussman & tenBroek, The Equal Protection of the Laws, 37 CA=. L.
REv. 341, 359 n.36 (1949).
81 E.g., Hobson v. Hansen, 269 F. Supp. 401 (D.D.C. 1967).
82 Id. at 497; see Norwalk CORE v. Norwalk Redev. Agency, 395 F.2d
920 (2d Cir. 1968). For example, note the following rhetoric espoused by
various justices. Justice Douglas said that "strict scrutiny of the classifica-
tion ... is essential, lest unwittingly, or otherwise, invidious discriminations
are made against groups or types of individuals .... " Skinner v. Oklahoma,
316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942) (emphasis added). Justice White, concurring, felt
that "a statute with these effects bears a substantial burden of justification
when attacked under the Fourteenth Amendment." Griswold v. Connecticut,
381 U.S. 479, 503 (1965) (emphasis added). Chief Justice Warren, in Reynolds
v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964), stated that "the effect of state legislative dis-
tricting schemes which give the same number of representatives to unequal
numbers of constituents is ... discrimination against those individual voters
living in disfavored areas . . . ." Id. at 562-63 (emphasis added). Judge
Wisdom has added to the rhetoric by stating that "[a] benign and theoretically
neutral principle loses its aura of sanctity when it fails to function neu-
trally." Labat v. Bennett, 365 F.2d 698, 724 (5th Cir. 1966) (emphasis added).
83 Cf. Hobson v. Hansen, 269 F. Supp. 401, 497 (D.D.C. 1967).
84 E.g., Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (de jure racial
segregation in public schools); Hobson v. Hansen, 269 F. Supp. 401 (D.D.C.
1967) (alternative holding) (de facto racial segregation in public schools).
85 E.g., Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964) (differential weight of a
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or to a limited extent economic status 6 in the governing process.
For example, the plaintiffs in Hawkins v. Shaw8 7 and Harris v. Itta
Bena, s8 the two actions filed in the federal district court in Missis-
sippi for sub-standard municipal services discussed in the introduc-
tion to this article, alleged that three classes of discrimination were
present in the denial of adequate services-race, residence and pov-
erty. It is clear that if the residents of an under-serviced area also
constitute a well defined racial group, their cause will be strength-
ened by the racial discrimination argument. Nevertheless, it is im-
portant that economic status alone be accorded singular recogni-
tion by the courts as a reason for forbidding sub-standard municipal
services.
The economic status argument for invalidating classifications un-
der the equal protection clause has a more universal application
than does the racial classification argument; many northern cities
and towns have few minority residents and yet have numerous un-
derserviced neighborhoods. Furthermore, the economic status argu-
ment forecloses the contention that there is in fact no racial dis-
crimination because Caucasians live in the affected area as well as
the particular racial minority, or minorities, alleged to have been dis-
criminated against. For example, it has been said of Harper v. Board
of Elections, 9 where the Virginia poll tax was invalidated because
of its effects on the poor (not because of racial considerations) that
"the new status of indigence . .. reflects the turning of America's
conscience from the narrow problems of Negro rights to a wider
recognition of the disadvantaged position of the poor of all races." 90
The Harper decision has added significance in that the petitioners
had based their assertion of the statute's invalidity solely upon indi-
gency.9 1
The economic status argument is applicable to numerous areas
of local governmental control which have heretofore received inade-
quate scrutiny. These are areas where economic position substan-
citizen's vote based upon his place of residence within a state); Griffin v.
School Bd., 377 U.S. 218, 229-31 (1964) (dictum); Hall v. School Bd., 197 F.
Supp. 649 (E.D. La. 1961), aff'd, 368 U.S. 515 (1962) (public school system dis-
mantled to avoid a desegregation order).
80 E.g., Harper v. Board of Election, 383 U.S. 663 (1966) (poll tax
impermissible classification based on economic status of voter); Douglas v.
California, 372 U.S. 353 (1964) (right to counsel); Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S.
12 (1956) (indigent's right to trial transcript).
87 Civil No. DC6737, CCH PovEaRT L. REP. 2400.40 (N.D. Miss., filed Nov.
21, 1967).
88 Civil No. GC6756 (N.D. Miss., filed Nov. 21, 1967).
89 383 U.S. 663 (1966).
90 The Supreme Court, 1965 Term, 80 HARV. L. Rav. 91, 180 (1966).
91 Harper v. Board of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966).
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tially affects the quality of service or of opportunity provided by the
government. For example: The quality of education available to
children within any local school district is dependent largely upon the
value of real property within that district;92 court fees or bonds
may effectively deny access to courts for civil litigants;93 the ability
of an indigent to litigate a civil action effectively obviously depends
on his access to counsel;94 the indigent criminal defendant may re-
quire non-legal assistance, such as that provided by psychiatrists and
investigators, but for which he cannot pay;95 the amount of bail set
in criminal cases most often depends on the seriousness of the offense,
not on the ability of the accused to make bail;9 6 vagrancy statutes
provide criminal punishment for those who exist in the condition of
poverty;97 the alternative sentence of fine or imprisonment is a
highly illusory choice to the indigent.9 8
At this juncture it should be reiterated that a municipal equaliza-
tion case based entirely upon discrimination on the basis of economic
92 See generally Horowitz & Neitring, Equal Protection Aspects of In-
equalities in Public Education and Public Assistance Programs From Place
to Place Within a State, 15 U.C.L.A.L. REv. 787 (1968); Horowitz, Unseparate
but Unequal--The Emerging Fourteenth Amendment Issue in Public Educa-
tion, 13 U.C.L.A.L. REV. 1147 (1966).
Among all elementary school districts in California in 1965-66, the varia-
tion in assessed valuation, per unit of average daily attendance, was $57 to
$2,187, a ratio of more than 38:1. Two cases are now pending before the
California courts on this issue. Silva v. Atascadero Unified School Dist., No.
595954 (Super. Ct., San Francisco City and County, Cal., filed Sept. 26, 1968);
Serrano v. Priest, No. 938254 (Super. Ct., Los Angeles County, Cal., filed
Aug. 23, 1968).
93 See Williams v. Shaffer, 385 U.S. 1037, 1039 (1967) (Douglas, J.) (dis-
senting opinion). See generally, Note, Poverty and Equal Access to the
Courts: The Constitutionality of Summary Dispossess in Georgia, 20 STAw. L.
REV. 766 (1968).
94 See generally Note, The Right to Counsel in Civil Litigation, 66
CoLOm. L. REV. 1322 (1966); Note, The Indigent's Right to Counsel in Civil
Cases, 76 YALE L.J. 545 (1967).
95 See generally Goldstein & Fine, The Indigent Accused, the Psychia-
trist, and the Insanity Defense, 110 U. PA. L. REv. 1061 (1962); Weihofen,
Mental Health Services for the Poor, 54 CALIr. L. REV. 920 (1966).
96 See generally Foote, The Coming Constitutional Crisis in Bail, 113
U. PA. L. REV. 959 (1965).
97 Cf. Fenster v. Leary, 20 N.Y.2d 309, 229 N.E.2d 426, 282 N.Y.S.2d 739
(1967), which held New York's vagrancy statute unconstitutional as an over-
reaching of the police power. See generally Foote, Vagrancy-Type Law and
Its Administration, 104 U. PA. L. REv. 603 (1956).
98 United States ex rel. Martin v. Erwin, CCH POVERTY L. REP. ff 750.20
(W.D. La. Feb. 27, 1968) (alternative sentence violative of equal protection
where defendant not allowed to pay fine in installments); accord In re
Figueroa, No. 4502-C (Super. Ct., Mendocino County, Cal., filed Oct. 31, 1968).
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status would have little chance of success.9 9 With a racial discrimi-
nation claim, however, support could be drawn from the pre-Brown
v. Board of Education'0 0 decisions which were concerned with equaliz-
ing school facilities during the separate but equal era.101
Notwithstanding the present posture of the law, two recent de-
cisions, one in the Supreme Court, Harper v. Board of Elections,10 2
and the other in the Federal District Court of the District of Columbia,
Hobson v. Hansen,0 3 have extended the principle that discrimi-
nation on the basis of economic status is violative of equal protec-
tion. The foundation for this extension is the previously discussed
case of Griffin v. Illinois,1°" in which the Court introduced a new
suspect classification, discrimination on the basis of economic sta-
tus,105 giving substance and force to the single voice of Mr. Justice
Jackson in Edwards v. California.106 None of the opinions in Griffin
discussed the necessity for an intentionally unfair discrimination. 10 7
The rational basis supporting the practice--that of protecting public
funds from depletion by a required furnishing of transcripts to in-
digents-was insufficient to overcome the invidious nature of the
classification. Justice Harlan recognized that the majority opinion
held "that, at least in this area of criminal appeals, the Equal Protec-
tion Clause imposes on the States an affirmative duty to lift the
handicaps flowing from differences in economic circumstances."' 0 8
Indeed!
99 See text following note 88, supra.
100 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
101 See, e.g., McKissick v. Carmichael, 187 F.2d 949 (4th Cir.), cert.
denied, 341 U.S. 951 (1951) (general physical condition of school buildings);
Pitts v. Board of Trustees, 84 F. Supp. 975 (E.D. Ark. 1949) (sewerage, toilet,
and drinking fountain facilities). See generally Leflar, Segregation in the
Public Schools-1953, 67 HARV. L. Rav. 377 (1954).
102 383 U.S. 663 (1966).
103 269 F. Supp. 401 (D.D.C. 1967).
104 351 U.S. 12 (1956).
105 But see Allen, Griffin v. Illinois: Antecedents and Aftermath, 25
U. CHr. L. Rav. 151, 155-56 (1957), where similar unarticulated reasoning in
Cochran v. Kansas, 316 U.S. 255 (1942), and Dowd v. Cook, 340 U.S. 206
(1951), is analyzed.
106 314 U.S. 160 (1941).
107 See text and authorities at notes 80-82 supra, for the lack of vital-
ity of this requirement in a suspect classification case.
"Thus Griffin is based on the totally novel doctrine that unintentional
and accidental inequality, if it affects important rights of the poor, violates
equal protection to the same extent as does intentional hostile, aggressive, and
invidious discrimination." Jeffries v. Jeffries, 37 U.S.L.W. 2337 (N.Y. Sup.
Ct., Dec. 6, 1968) (state is required by equal protection to pay cost of service
of publication in indigent's divorce action).
108 351 U.S. at 34 (dissenting opinion).
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Harper v. Board of Elections
The breakthrough into civil matters of the principle disallowing
discrimination based upon economic status came in Harper v. Board
of Elections,10 9 which struck down the Virginia poll tax because
of its discriminatory effect on the voting rights of the poor. Tr. Jus-
tice Douglas said: "Lines drawn on the basis of wealth or property,
like those of race ... are traditionally disfavored. [Citing Edwards
and Griffin]. The degree of discrimination is irrelevant."110  One
commentator thought it somewhat "surprising that they based their
discrimination argument on indigency rather than race . . ." though
he recognized that studies had indicated that the tax had deterred
more poor "whites than Negroes from voting."11 1 This can be in-
terpreted as a recognition by the Court that racial problems are sub-
sumed under and subsidiary to the problems of the poor. 12
It should be noted that Mr. Justice Douglas, in his opinion in
Harper, strengthened the equal protection clause, clarified the analy-
sis of Brown v. Board of Education, and gave a further doctrinal
rationale to Griffin v. Illinois. In Brown, Chief Justice Warren said:
"In approaching this problem, we cannot turn the clock back to 1868
when the Amendment was adopted, or even to 1896 when Plessy v.
Ferguson was written."'113 Returning to this theme in Harper, Mr.
Justice Douglas said:
[T]he Equal Protection Clause is not shackled to the particular theory
of a particular era. In determining what lines are unconstitutionally
discrhminatory, we ha-e never b&en confined to historic notions of
equality .... Notions of what constitutes equal treatment for the
purposes of [the clause] do change.114
Hobson v. Hansen
The current, yet not final, stage of development of constitutional
protection of the poor is represented by Hobson v. Hansen,"5 where
Judge Skelly Wright held that de facto segregation and the track
system'" was violative of equal protection because it constituted
discrimination "on the basis of racial or economic status in the opera-
tion of the District of Columbia public school system.11 1 7  Plain-
109 383 U.S. 663 (1966).
110 Id. at 668. -
111 The Supreme Court, 1965 Term, 80 HARv. L. REv. 91, 177 (1966).
112 See the findings of fact of Judge Skelly Wright in Hobson v. Hansen,
269 F. Supp. 401, 405-07, 431-32, 451-52 (D.D.C. 1967).
113 Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483, 492 (1954).
114 Harper v. Board of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 669 (1966).
115 269 F. Supp. 401 (D.D.C. 1967).
116 Id. at 442 (track system explained).
117 Id, at 517. See generally Note, Hobson v. Hansen: Judicial Super-
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tiffs introduced evidence of deliberate, discriminatory intent; defend-
ants introduced evidence of a lack of such intent; Judge Wright
rejected both arguments saying that "It]he causes of the inequalities
are relatively objective and impersonal. School officials can be
faulted, but for another reason: that in the face of these inequalities
they have sometimes shown little concern." 118  The constitutional
infirmity found by the court was the operation and effect of the
school district's policies. Throughout his opinion, Judge Wright rec-
ognized the combination of effects upon one who is both a member of
a racial minority and poor.1 9 But he also recognized that the ex-
istence of both factors was not constitutionally necessary, saying:
"even if race could be ruled out, which it cannot, defendants surely
'can no more discriminate on account of poverty than on account of
religion, race or color.' [Citing Griffin] .112 0 In sum, Hobson v. Han-
sen held that where policies, benign or inept, result in the unequal
provision of municipal services to racial minorities or to the poor,
municipal authorities are constitutionally obliged by the equal protec-
tion clause both to discontinue these policies and to take affirma-
tive action to ensure equality. 1 2 1
The Principle Applied
Schools and Sewers?
In Hobson, the municipal. service considered was an educational
facility. What of other municipal services? Is their provision a right
less worthy of protection? The decision of the Supreme Court in
Katzenbach v. Morgan'2 2 is instructive.
In Katzenbach v. Morgan, the Court was presented with the
question of the validity of section 4(e) of the Voting Rights Act of
1965 which provides in pertinent part:
[In order] to secure the rights under the fourteenth amendment of
persons educated in American-flag schools in which the predominant
classroom language was other than English, it is necessary to pro-
hibit the States from conditioning the right to vote of such persons
on ability to read, write, understand, or interpret any matter in...
English .... 123
vision of the Color-Blind School Board, 81 HARV. L. Ray. 1511 (1968); Com-
ment, Hobson v. Hansen: The De Facto Limits on Judicial Power, 20 STAN. L.
R a. 1249 (1968).
118 Hobson v. Hansen, 269 F. Supp. 401, 441-42 (D.D.C. 1967).
119 Id. at 443, 482, 483.
120 Id. at 513.
121 The school district was required to provide transportation for children
who volunteered to enroll at other schools. Id. at 517.
122 384 U.S. 641 (1966).
123 Voting Rights Act of 1965, § 4(e) (1), 79 Stat. 439 (1965) (emphasis
added) (codified in 42 U.S.C. § 1973 (b) (e) (1), Supp. I, 1965). Section 4 (e) (2)
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The Court upheld the Act as a "necessary and proper" exercise of
congressional power under section five of the fourteenth amendment
which grants Congress the "power to enforce, by appropriate legisla-
tion, the provisions of this article. " 124  The question whether a
literacy requirement itself violates the equal protection clause was not
reached. However, Mr. Justice Brennan, speaking for the Court,
stated that the granting of suffrage, and therefore political represen-
tation, would be a means of rectifying violations of the amendment
not related to voting. He said:
More specifically, § 4(e) may be viewed as a measure to secure for
the Puerto Rican community... nondiscriminatory treatment by gov-
ernment . .. [in] the provision or administration of governmental
services, such as public schools, public housing and law enforcement.
... This enhanced political power will be helpful in gaining non-
discriminatory treatment in public services for the entire Puerto Ri-
can community. Section 4(e) thereby enables the Puerto Rican minor-
ity better to obtain "perfect equality of civil rights and the equal pro-
tection of the laws."'1 25
This reasoning inferentially supports the conclusion that the equal
protection clause can be held applicable to municipal services other
than education.126
In answering the question whether it should be so applied, it
need only be asked whether dirty, filthy streets, unlit at night, beck-
oning the criminal, awash during winter storms, engender in those
who live in such under-serviced areas "a feeling of inferiority as to
their status in the community that may affect their hearts and minds
in a way unlikely ever to be undone."'127 Is the availability of an
attractive fun-filled playground less important to the heart and mind
of a ten-year old boy than is a new school? Perhaps some may think
so, but he probably does not.
Which Services?
Municipal services can be said to fall into two broad categories:
(1) those which are general in character, in that they confer a gen-
restricts the operation of section 4(e) (1) to those who have completed the sixth
grade in a Puerto Rican school where instruction was in Spanish. 42 U.S.C.
§ 1973(b)(e)(2) (Supp. I, 1965).
124 This is the familiar McCulloch v. Maryland test applicable to the
validity of the exercise of a congressional power. McCulloch v. Maryland,
17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 421 (1819). For a similar analysis of section 5 of the
fourteenth amendment, see United States v., Guest, 383 U.S. 745, 762, 782
(1966) (concurring opinions).
125 384 U.S. at 652-53.
126 For similar interpretations of Katzenbach see Cox, Forward: Con-
stitutional Adjudication and the Promotion of Human Rights, The Supreme
Court, 1965 Term, 80 HARv. L. REv. 91, 103 (1966); The Supreme Court, 1965
Term, 80 H.Av. L. Rav. 125, 173 (1966).
127 Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483, 494 (1954).
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eral benefit on the whole community; 128 and (2) those which are
local in character, in that they confer benefits upon individual par-
cels of property. The approach taken in order to apply the foregoing
equal protection argument to each category must vary, depending to
a great extent upon the character of the expenditure necessary for
the provision of the service and the action or inaction of the mu-
nicipality relative to its provision.
Local improvements consist generally of the construction of
streets, sidewalks and sewers.1 29 The recipients of the benefits of
local improvements are held accountable to pay for those benefits
by means of special tax assessments against their property. "The
benefits conferred are at least full compensation for the expense im-
imposed .... "130
Special assessments ordinarily are not levied for the maintenance
and repair of the improvements after their original construction,
even though additional benefits clearly accrue to the adjacent prop-
erty owner from these services.1 3 1 The funds for these expenditures
stem from general municipal revenues. The fact that such expendi-
tures are made from general revenues constitutes a significant de-
viation from the principle which supports special assessments-
that those who receive the benefits must pay for them. If it can be
shown that the costs of maintenance and repair constitute a signifi-
cant proportion of the original cost of the improvement, the refusal
to provide such improvements by a reliance on special assessment
rationale, that is, a refusal to provide because adjacent owners could
not absorb the initial cost of the improvement, would be quite vul-
nerable to an extension of the Griffin principle. If the maintenance
costs would be a significant amount in relation to the initial improve-
ment cost, the assessed residence would not be paying for the bene-
fits it receives. The effect of the application of Griffin would be to
require that both original construction and the maintenance expendi-
tures be made from general revenues, thereby ensuring adequate and
much needed services to those unable to meet the original assessment.
In addition, where some municipalities within a state provide cer-
tain services by means of special assessments and others provide the
same services by means of general revenues, an argument can be
made that territorial uniformity is required. Authority for this prop-
osition can be provided by analogy to those cases which hold that a
128 14 E. McQUILLAx, THE LAw OF MuNIcIPAL CoRPoRATIoNs § 38.11 (3d
ed. 1950).
129 Id. at §§ 38.12, 38.24.
130 Id. § 38.02, at 20-21 (emphasis added), quoting Whitmore v. Hart-
ford, 196 Conn. 511, 512, 114 A. 686, 689 (1921).
131 14 E. McQuLLAN, THE LAW OF MuNiciPAL CoRPoRATIoNs § 38.25 (3d
ed. 1950); see 13 McQUILLAN, supra note 14, at § 37.113.
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state cannot allow the dismantling of public education in one area of
the state while providing such education in the remaining areas.132
The obvious danger in making this argument is that the state may
elect the special assessment alternative instead of the general reve-
nue method of financing municipal services. This election would, of
course, bring the state within the ambit of the problems discussed in
the preceding paragraphs of this section.
Services of a general character present two major issues in a
municipal equalization case: The situs and the adequacy of the serv-
ice provided. Park and recreation facilities and libraries provide
good examples. Where such facilities exist in the more affluent
areas (or white areas, if a claim of racial discrimination is made)
of the municipality and comparable facilities do not exist in the
areas occupied by poor residents, the site selection policy of the mu-
nicipality is subject to question. Gautreaux v. Chicago Housing Au-
thority1 3 3 held that racial considerations in the selection of public
housing project sites are prohibited by the equal protection clause.
While the plaintiffs in Gautreaux sought to have the housing proj-
ect built in a white neighborhood, not in their own, the reasoning
would seem applicable to a situation in which the residents seek the
construction of a public facility, such as a park or a library, in their
neighborhood. As discussed earlier, under the equal protection
clause considerations of wealth would seem no more permissible
than those of race.
Where facilities or services are provided in the less affluent areas
of a municipality, the question of equalization concerns the ade-
quacy of the service. These problems are largely factual once the
concept of equalization is recognized, and their solution will depend
upon the circumstances of each case. For example, the Riot Commis-
sion Report states that in New York City there are six garbage pick-
ups weekly in slum areas, compared to thrice-weekly pickups in other
areas. Yet, due to significantly higher population densities and other
132 Griffin v. School Bd., 377 U.S. 218 (1964); Hall v. School Bd., 197
F. Supp. 649 (E.D. La. 1961); Bush v. School Bd., 187 F. Supp. 42 (E.D. La.
1960), aff'd, 365 U.S. 569 (1961); Aaron v. McKinley, 173 F. Supp. 944 (E.D.
Ark.), affd sub nom. Faubus v. Aaron, 361 U.S. 197 (1959). See generally
Horowitz & Neitring, Equal Protection Aspects of Inequalities in Public Edu-
cation and Public Assistance Programs frori Place to Place Within a State,
15 U.C.L.A.L. REv. 787 (1968).
133 265 F. Supp. 582 (N.D. Iil. 1967). Defendant's motion to dismiss was
granted because plaintiffs failed to allege that the site selection policy was
deliberately intended to discriminate against them on the basis of race. The
Court acknowledged that inferential evidence of such intent should be suffi-
cient; it did not, however, agree that the policy was constitutionally invalid if
its operation and effect of the policy was to discriminate against the plain-
tiffs.
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factors, garbage collection still may be found to be inadequate in the
slum area.134
Conclusion
Unequal provision of services by municipalities is often the result
of a complex interaction of the race, economic status and inadequate
political representation of the residents of underserviced areas. Rec-
ognition of the problem as one amenable to an equal protection anal-
ysis based on the economic status of the affected individuals would
facilitate dealing with the problem in its broadest aspect. Further-
more, adoption of the principle that the constitutionality of a state
statute or policy can be tested by its operation and effect will over-
come the possibilities of subterfuge inherent in the requirement of
proof of intentional discrimination. Although the courts have yet to
deal with many of the issues in this area in a specific manner, the
urgency of this problem and its effect upon millions of Americans
dictates immediate consideration. 35
134 See note 3 supra.
135 See San Francisco Examiner, Jan. 8, 1969, at 40, cols. 1-2: "A Rat's
a Rat.
One of the more bizarre news stories of the week concerns the discovery
of a bustling rat colony right in the middle of New York's exclusive Park
Avenue. Health Department exterminators quickly appeared.
That leads us to wonder. If official reaction to reports of rats in the
slums were as prompt as it was on the exclusive stretch of Park Avenue,
wouldn't there be millions fewer rats in the United States today? A rat is
a rat, and every American is entitled to equal protection under the health
laws."
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